In a Nutshell

On 18 May 2026, a Belgian Court dismissed a defamation suit brought by the Thomas More Institute, a think tank, against Paul Magnette, president of Belgium’s Socialist Party. During a televised interview, Magnette had described the institute as an “extreme right institute, recognised as extreme right” and “a French extreme right institute close to the RN [National Rally]”.

The court held that those statements were value judgments, not factual assertions, and that Magnette had a sufficient factual basis to form and express that opinion. It cited Wikipedia’s characterisation of the institute as “close to the traditionalist far right”; the political history of founder Charles Millon; the affiliations of board member Charles Beigbeder and deputy director Aymeric de Lamotte; the Projet Périclès funding from Pierre-Édouard Stérin; and press articles linking de Lamotte to far-right initiatives. The court emphasized that it was not required to verify the exactness of each source, only to determine that Magnette could reasonably have relied on them to reach his view.

Our Take

European democracies are under sustained criticism, much of it reasonable, for failing to uphold free expression consistently. This judgment will not magically solve this, but it is a positive development. It should also serve as a warning.

The Court did not endorse any political speech and did not label the institute. The most important move the judgment makes is also its most easily misunderstood. The court declined to verify every source Magnette cited: it asked only whether he had some reasonable ground for his view. That is precisely the correct standard for a value judgment in political debate.

But the same concept, i.e. reasonable grounds to believe, is dangerous if transplanted into other legal contexts, particularly those involving punitive action. Anyone relying on similar reasonable grounds, for example press articles suggesting guilt by association, to impose a sanction (a visa denial, a funding cut, a professional restriction) should be scrutinized under a different standard. This is especially true for critical institutions (health, education, defense, etc), and obviously for state action.

The judgment itself does not conflate these things. It should not be weaponised by those who would. Free speech is essential, and this judgment is good. But it should be understood within this framework: as a defence of political speech against legal intimidation, not as a licence to treat “reasonable belief” as sufficient grounds for action in contexts where precision, proof, and due process are required.