A new working paper by economist Philipp Denter from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid challenges the comforting assumption that democratic competition always pulls politicians toward the center. Through game-theoretic modeling, the research uncovers a “U-shaped” relationship between societal division and policy platforms. While low-level disagreement creates incentives for moderation, the study identifies a mathematical tipping point. Once a society crosses a specific threshold of ideological distance, the incentives flip: electoral competition no longer encourages compromise. Instead, it forces parties, even those with high competence and broad appeal, to adopt increasingly extreme positions to survive.

Our Take

This research highlights the risk that the political marketplace can be structurally incentivized to produce extremism, meaning the “pendulum” is unlikely to swing back to moderation on its own. This validates our core premise: we cannot rely on external political stability to safeguard our society’s essential functions. If more competition only deepen the “polarization trap,” the solution must be structural. Critical institutions, from universities to healthcare systems, must stop waiting for the storm to pass and start building internal resilience. By implementing Attack Surface Reduction and enforcing strict institutional neutrality, we can create firewalls that insulate our society’s core missions from the inevitable turbulence of the political sphere.